We show a new impossibility result for Quantum string commitment (QSC) schemes (introduced in [BCH + 05]). For a single execution of protocol we show binding-concealing trade-offs in terms of the well known and studied Holevo-χ information. Our result is an improvement over the result of [BCH + 05] who, for a single execution of the protocol, showed binding-concealing trade-offs in terms of a quantity introduced by them called the One shot Holevo-Ξ information (please refer to Section 1 for definition). We consider our result as an improvement since for any ensemble E, Ξ(E) ≥ χ(E). The significance of our result arises from the fact that the trade-off is shown in terms of the well studied Holevo-χ information.
Introduction
Commitment schemes are powerful cryptographic primitives. Bit commitment schemes are very well studied and strong negative results are known about them. Quantum string commitment schemes were introduced in [BCH + 05] . In a string commitment protocol there are two mistrustful parties, say Alice and Bob. Alice tries to first commit a string to Bob, so that Bob does not get to know the string and Alice cannot change it. At a later time Alice is supposed to give reveal information to Bob so that he can get to know the string. In commitment schemes, often some trade-off is allowed between the degrees of concealment and bindingness of the protocol. Let us below formally define a QSC scheme [BCH + Let B ∈ {Ξ(E), χ(E)} (defined later) denote the quantity which measures the amount of quantum information of ensemble E = {p x , ρ x }. An (n, a, b) − B − QSC scheme is a quantum string commitment protocol satisfying the following criteria:
• (Concealing) We require that Bob's information at the end of the commit phase measured in terms of B should be no larger than b, i.e. B(E) ≤ b.
• (Binding) For any cheating strategy of Alice, x∈{0,1} npx ≤ 2 a wherep x is the probability with which Alice is able to successfully reveal x ∈ {0, 1} n at the reveal phase.
Remarks:
1. We consider Alice and Bob to be a closed system which implies that at all times in any protocol (honest or cheating) the combined state of Alice and Bob is a pure state. 
showed that for single execution of the protocol an (n, a, b)-Ξ-QSC with a + b + 5 log(2 + 4 (2)) − 1 < n is impossible, where b is the one shot Holevo-Ξ information of the ensemble E = {1/2 n , ρ x }.
We show a new impossibility result for QSCs. We show binding-concealing trade-offs in terms of the well known Holevo-χ information. Holevo information of an ensemble
where as before ρ = x p x ρ x . We show the following: Theorem 1.1 Every (n, a, b) − χ − QSC scheme with a + 16b + 31 < n is impossible where b is the Holevo information considered under the uniform distribution.
Remark: As mentioned in the abstract this result is stronger than the result of [BCH + 05] since for any ensemble E, Ξ(E) ≥ χ(E). This result is significant since the trade-off is in terms of the well known and studied Holevo-χ information. Also since our technique is quite different from [BCH + 05] , it is independently interesting. It will be interesting to see if this technique finds other applications.
We also consider the notion of maximum possible information introduced in [Jai05] of the encoding E :
Definition 1.2 (Maximum possible information) Maximum possible information in an encoding
We show the following:
Remark: As mentioned in the abstract this result is completely new and nothing similar has been shown in [BCH + 05] .
It is easily seen that the above parameters, up to constants are achieved by trivial protocols. For Theorem 1.1 above consider the following protocol. Alice in the concealing phase sends the first b bits of the n-bit string x. Hence Bob gets to know b bits of Holevo information about x. In the reveal phase a cheating Alice can now reveal any of the 2 n−b strings x (consistent with the first b bits being the ones sent) with probability 1. Hence a ≥ log 2 n−b = n − b. For Theorem 1.2 above let Alice send one of the 2 b strings uniformly to Bob representing the first b bits of x. The condition of Theorem 1.2 is satisfied. Now if in the reveal phase she wants to commit any x, she can do so with probability 2 −b (in the event that the sent bits are consistent with x).
In the next section we state some quantum information theoretic facts that will be useful in the proof of the impossibility results which we prove in section 3.
Preliminaries
For a linear operator A let |A| = √ A † A and let TrA denote the trace of A. Given a quantum state ρ, the von-Neumann entropy of ρ is defined as S(ρ) ∆ = Trρ log ρ. Given two quantum states ρ, σ the relative entropy between them is defined as S(ρ||σ) ∆ = Trρ(log ρ− log σ). Given a state ρ ∈ H and a pure state |φ ∈ H ⊗ K, we call |φ a purification of ρ iff Tr K |φ φ| = ρ.
The following can be easily observed from the definitions:
We make a central use the following information-theoretic result called the substate theorem due to Jain, Radhakrishnan, and Sen [JRS02] .
Theorem 2.1 (Substate theorem, [JRS02]) Let H, K be two finite dimensional Hilbert spaces and dim(K) ≥ dim(H).
Let C 2 denote the two dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let ρ, σ be density matrices in H such that S(ρ σ) < ∞. Let |ρ be a purification of ρ in H ⊗ K. Then, for r > 1, there exist pure states |φ , |θ ∈ H ⊗ K and |σ ∈ H ⊗ K ⊗ C 2 , depending on r, such that |σ is a purification of σ and Tr||ρ ρ| − |φ φ|| ≤ 2 √ r
, where
and k ∆ = 8S(ρ σ) + 14.
Remarks:
1. In the above theorem if the last qubit in |σ is measured in the computational basis, then probability of obtaining 1 is (1 − 1/r)2 −rk .
2. Later we will let |ρ to be |φ x which is the entire pure state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase of an honest run of the protocol when Alice is committing x. In this case we will let ρ
We also need the following theorems:
Theorem 2.2 (Local transition theorem [May97, LH97, LH98]) Let ρ be a quantum state in K.
Let |φ 1 and |φ 2 be two purification of ρ in H ⊗ K. Then there is a local unitary transformation U acting on H such that (U ⊗ I)|φ 1 = |φ 2 .
Theorem 2.3 ([Jai05])
Let X be a finite set. Let E : x → ρ x be an encoding. Let T (E) ≤ b.
Then, there exists a distribution
µ ∆ = {q x } on X such that ∀x ∈ X, S(ρ x ||ρ) ≤ b where ρ = x q x ρ x .
Theorem 2.4 ([NC00]) Given two quantum states ρ and σ, the probability of distinguishing them is at most
Tr|ρ−σ| 2 .
Proof of impossibility
Proof of Theorem 1.1: Let us consider a QSC scheme and let ρ x be the states as in Definition 1.1. Let A, B denote Alice and Bob's part respectively in their joint quantum state. Let |φ x denote the combined pure state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase in an honest run when Alice commits x. Hence ρ x = Tr A |φ x φ x |. Let E = {1/2 n , ρ x }. Let χ(E) ≤ b. Consider a cheating run of the protocol by Alice in which she starts with the superposition x 1/2 n |x in the register where she keeps the commit string and then proceeds with the rest of the commit phase as usual. Let |ψ be the entire pure state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase of this cheating run. Let ρ B ∆ = Tr A |ψ ψ|. We note that in this case ρ B = x 1/2 n ρ x . Let us now invoke Theorem 2.1 by putting ρ
Let |ψ x be the pure state |σ obtained from Theorem 2.1. Since Tr A |ψ x ψ x | = Tr A |ψ ψ|, from local transition theorem there exists a transformation acting only on Alice's side which takes |ψ to |ψ x . If Alice wants to commit some x she applies this transformation which transforms |ψ to |ψ x and then she measures the last qubit in the computational basis. She obtains 1 with probability (1 − 1/r)2 −rk . If she obtains 1 then she goes ahead with the rest of the reveal information as in the original honest protocol. If she obtains a 0, she aborts the protocol. Let |φ ′ x be the pure state of Alice and Bob when she measures 1. From Theorem 2.1,
Since after this Alice and Bob apply the same transformations as in an honest run, at the end of the reveal phase as well, the combined state of Alice and Bob in an honest run (say |H ) and the cheating run (say |C ) satisfy Tr||H H| − |C C|| ≤ 2/ √ r. From Theorem 2.4 Bob will not be able to differentiate between the two cases with probability more than 1/ √ r. Hence probability of successp x for Alice is at least (1 − 1/ √ r)(1 − 1/r)2 −rk where k = 8S(ρ x ||ρ) + 14. We put r = 2 and get The second inequality comes from the convexity of the exponential function and the third inequality comes from Lemma 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.2: Let µ = {q x } be the distribution on {0, 1} n obtained from Theorem 2.3. Consider a cheating strategy of Alice in which she puts the superposition x √ q x |x in the register where she keeps the commit string. Now by arguments as above probability of successp x for Alice is at least (1 − 1/ √ r)(1 − 1/r)2 −rk where k = 8S(ρ x ||ρ) + 14. Since for all x, S(ρ x ||ρ) ≤ b it implies (by putting r = 2) ∀x,p x ≥ 2 −16b−31 Remark: In the above theorems the constant has been chosen arbitrarily. There is a trade-off that is allowed between the multiplicative constant in front of b and the additive constant, which has been omitted for simplicity.
